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Judicial review and governmental bad faith 
T
his column is the third and final in­
stallment of a series considering 
some potential implications of June 
Medical Services v. Russo, a case involv­
ing a constitutional challenge to a 
Louisiana law regulating access to abor­
tion services. The United States Supreme 
Court heard arguments in the case on 
March 4. A decision is expected shortly. 
The first column sought to place June 
Medical Services in context by describing 
the history of constitutional abortion-rights 
litigation at the Supreme Court. The sec­
ond explained what the case is likely to tell 
us about the respect the court will show to 
prior constitutional precedents - prior 
Supreme Court decisions interpreting the 
Constitution -with which it disagrees. 
This column discusses how the case il­
lustrates the difficulties presented when 
courts are asked to assess the constitution­
ality of laws alleged to have been enacted, 
or of other government action alleged to 
have-been undertaken; in bad faith - that­
is, for reasons other than those suggested 
on the face of the law or provided to justify 
the action. As discussed below, June Medi­
cal Services is not the only recent 
Supreme Court case to have grappled with 
this issue. 
Recall that June Medical Services in­
volves a challenge to a Louisiana law re­
quiring that physicians performing abor­
tions hold admitting privileges at a hospital 
within 30 miles of the facility where the 
abortion is performed. On its face, the law 
appears to be a regulatory measure de­
signed to ensure maternal health. But in 
reality, abortion is a very safe medical pro­
cedure that rarely requires hospitalization. 
And hospitals usually condition admitting 
privileges on the number of patients that a 
physician admits. 
The law thus creates a catch-22. Physi­
cians who perform abortions must have ad­
mitting privileges at a nearby hospital. Yet 
they cannot obtain or maintain such privi­
leges because the need to hospitalize abor­
tion patients arises so rarely. Thus, the ef­
fect of the law would likely be to reduce the 
number of physicians permitted to perform 
abortions in Louisiana. 
There is strong evidence that the au­
thors of the law knew and intended this re­
sult. Consequently, there is strong evi­
dence that the law's actual purpose was to 
reduce the number of abortions performed 
in the state, and not to preserve maternal 
health. 
So does this legislative ''bad faith" make 
the law unconstitutional? Possibly. But as 
with so many issues in constitutional law, it 
depends. Justices from the conservative 
and liberal wings of the court tend to dis­
agree about the extent to which it is appro­
priate for judges to question the motives of 
other governmental branches and actors. 
Bad faith does not make governmental 
conduct unconstitutional in and of itself. A 
litigant challenging the constitutionality of 
a law does not prevail merely by showing 
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bad faith. Rather, the litigant must show 
that the bad-faith explanation masks an 
unconstitutional purpose behind the law or 
governmental action. 
In cases that do not involve fundamen­
tal rights or allegations that the govern­
ment is trying to cover up presumptively 
unconstitutional discrimination, courts as­
sume good faith and ask only whether the 
challenged law or conduct could be justi­
fied by some conceivably legitimate pur­
pose. The presumption of good faith ap­
plied in most cases avoids unnecessary 
confrontations with other branches of gov­
ernment and permits courts to sidestep 
the sticky problem of determining the sub­
jective intent of an actor or institution -for 
example, a legislature - that may be com­
prised of many individuals who often act 
for different reasons. 
U.S. Railroad Retirement Board v. 
Fritz (1980) illustrates this point. The case 
involved a challenge to a federal law that 
sought to prevent retired railroad workers 
from collecting benefits under both the 
railroad retirement system and the Social 
Security system. The law permitted those 
who were already retired and receiving 
benefits from both sources to continue to 
receive them. But it disallowed those who 
were not yet retired from doing so unless 
they had worked for the railroads for 25 
years. The result was that a current retiree 
who had worked only 10 years for the rail­
roads would collect dual benefits. Yet a per­
son who had worked 24 years for the rail­
roads and was still employed would not. 
Workers negatively affected by the law 
challenged it as unconstitutionally irra­
tional and arbitrary. But the Supreme 
Court rejected the challenge. Accepting 
the government's argument that Congress 
could have concluded that those who had 
acquired a statutory entitlement to bene­
fits from both sources while still employed 
in the railroad industry "had a greater eq­
uitable claim to those benefits" than those 
who were in the negatively affected class, 
the court held that this merely conceivable 
purpose was enough to sustain the law 
even if it was not the actual purpose. 
This is the default, presumptively appli­
cable approach. But in cases (unlike Fritz) 
involving allegations that governmental 
bad faith masks an intent to infringe a fun­
damental right or to engage in presump­
tively unconstitutional discrimination, the 
court does not stop the inquiry upon a 
showing of some conceivable, legitimate 
purpose. Instead, recognizing that such a 
deferential approach would not sufficiently 
safeguard essential constitutional guaran­
tees, courts will proceed to examine the ac­
tual purpose(s) of the law or action. 
In such cases, the justices of the 
Supreme Court are unlikely to disagree 
about the enforceability of laws or other 
government action prompted by an uncon­
stitutional purpose. But they are quite 
likely to disagree about how easily courts 
should find that the law or action has been 
tainted by an unconstitutional purpose. In
recent cases involving claims of govern­
mental bad faith, the more liberal justices 
have shown a greater willingness to find 
bad faith, while the more conservative jus­
tices have tended to show more deference 
to politically accountable authorities. 
Consider, in this respect, Trump v. 
Hawaii (2018) and Department of Com­
merce v. New York (2019). In the former 
case, Chief Justice John Roberts (who now 
appears to be the court's swing vote) sided 
with the conservatives to reject a claim 
that President Donald 'lrump's "travel 
ban'' masked unconstitutional religious dis­
crimination against Muslims. In the latter 
case, however, he sided with the liberals to 
find that the reason given by the adminis­
tration for attempting to add a citizenship 
question to the 2020 census was not sup­
ported by the record. 
Fast forward to the June Medical Ser­
vices case. In 2016, in Whole Woman's 
Health v. Hellerstedt, the Supreme Court 
issued a 5-3 ruling striking down a Texas 
law that was very similar to the Louisiana 
law whose constitutionality is under review 
in June Medical Services. (Justice Antonin 
Scalia had recently passed away and his 
seat was then unfilled.) The majority con­
cluded that the law's purpose was to place 
a substantial obstacle in the path of a 
woman choosing to exercise her right to 
terminate a pregnancy, and not to preserve 
maternal health. Under court precedent, 
this finding made the law unconstitutional. 
But since Whole Woman's Health was 
decided, Justice Anthony Kennedy has re­
tired and been replaced by Justice Brett 
Kavanaugh. Moreover, Justice Neil Gor­
such has filled the vacancy left by Justice 
Scalia. Thus, June Medical Services may 
well provide us with further instruction on 
the extent to which the current court will 
be open to giving close review to whether 
politically accountable actors have acted in 
good faith in exercising their constitutional 
authority. 
(John Greabe teaches constitutional 
law and directs the Warren B. Rudman 
Center for Justice, Leadership & Public 
Service at the University of New Hamp­
shire Franklin Pierce School of Law. The 
opinions he expresses in his "Constitu­
tional Connections" columns are entirely 
his own.) 
LETTERS TO THE EDITOR 
A beautiful reminder 
of graduations past 
I have been retired from teaching and 
coaching since 2008. Every one of my chil­
dren graduated from Concord High School 
while I was there as a teacher and coach. 
I was so proud of their accomplish­
ments and need to move on. I have not re­
turned to a graduation since. However, I 
also remember the feeling of seeing many 
of VlY students and runners graduating as 
well. I had taught and coached them and 
knew them for many years. So I can relate 
to Heidi Crumrine's column (Monitor front 
page, June 12). 
Heidi, I want to thank you for reminding 
me what graduation is all about. That arti­
cle was fantastic to read. I did get choked 
up a few times but managed to keep read­
ing. 
The article I speak about is titled, "I 
loved being part of your 'wild and precious 
life.' " How appropriate to be able to follow 
a bunch of young beautiful students to the 
finish line. 
Yes, this article did remind me of the 
.. 
feeling around graduation, after following 
these student athletes throughout their 
education and onto bigger and better 
things. 
So again, Heidi, I thank you for the re­
minder and the article that so carefully 
stated what it feels like to watch a group of 
young students throughout their academic 
years and see them off as they march 
across the stage to receive their diploma 
with a huge smile on their face. 
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